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ABSTRACT 
The first Justice John Marshall Harlan’s status as one of the greatest Supreme Court Justices in 
American history rests largely upon his civil rights jurisprudence.  The literature exploring the 
nuances of Harlan’s civil rights jurisprudence is vast.  Far less attention has been paid to the 
reasons for Harlan’s strong civil rights views.  Developing a rich sense of Harlan’s thinking has 
been difficult because Harlan did not leave behind a large trove of non-judicial writings.  There is, 
however, a remarkable source of Harlan’s thought that has been largely overlooked by scholars:  
Harlan’s constitutional law lectures at George Washington Law School of 1897–1898.  These 
lectures are currently housed in the Harlan papers in the Library of Congress, but they have never 
been published, have rarely been cited, and are largely unknown. 
These lectures provide extraordinary insight into Harlan’s civil rights jurisprudence.  In these 
lectures, Harlan lays out a remarkable and surprising theory of racial hierarchy—with Anglo-
Saxons as the superior group—that seems to be at complete odds with his egalitarian civil rights 
jurisprudence.  He also was a staunch opponent of the immigration of inferior racial groups to the 
United States—particularly the Chinese. 
But Harlan’s theory of racial superiority did not, for the most part, lead him to disregard the rights 
of those citizens whom he considered to be racially inferior.  On the contrary, although Harlan 
argued that Anglo-Saxons were the superior racial group and that all other racial groups in the 
nation would eventually die out, he also contended that Anglo-Saxons would preserve their 
superior status only if they fulfilled their sacred duty to protect the liberty interests of those citizens 
who had traditionally been subjugated in America—particularly African Americans. 
Accordingly, despite Harlan’s embrace of a robust theory of racial supremacy, Harlan emerged as 
the greatest civil rights jurist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The first Justice John Marshall Harlan has been rightly regarded as the 
most important judicial proponent of the constitutional rights of African 
Americans of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Indeed, 
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Harlan’s status as one of the greatest Supreme Court Justices in American 
history rests largely upon his civil rights jurisprudence.1  One can certainly 
question whether Harlan was consistent in his embrace of African-American 
rights—for example, he saw no constitutional impediment to anti-
miscegenation laws2—but Harlan nevertheless deserves his place as the most 
vigorous judicial champion of black rights of his era.3 
The literature exploring the nuances of Harlan’s civil rights 
jurisprudence is extensive.4  Far less attention has been paid to the reasons 
 
 1 In 1970, a large group of law professors, historians, and political scientists identified 
Harlan to be one of the twelve “great” Justices in American history (and one of only four 
from the nineteenth century).  HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS:  A 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 412 (3d ed. 1992).  
Ironically, many scholars and jurists largely ignored Harlan’s work for several decades 
after his death.  Henry J. Abraham, John Marshall Harlan:  A Justice Neglected, 41 VA. L. REV. 
871, 871–72 (1955).  But Harlan’s reputation soared following the Court’s 1954 decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which was widely viewed as a 
vindication of Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).  
Harlan’s reputation today rests in significant measure on his dissenting opinions in Plessy 
and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).  In fact, Harlan’s dissent in Plessy has 
achieved almost mythic status. 
 2 Harlan’s views on anti-miscegenation laws are largely unknown, because he never had 
occasion to consider such laws while serving on the Court, and his extra-judicial 
statements on the issue are obscure.  Harlan did consider the constitutionality of 
imposing greater penalties on interracial fornication than on same-race fornication in 
Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), and joined a unanimous Court in finding no 
constitutional impediment to such distinctions, but he never had cause, as a Justice, to 
consider the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws.  Id. at 585.  In 1907, Harlan, 
along with Charles Henry Butler, the Reporter of the United States Supreme Court, 
published a little-known and rarely cited treatise on marriage law that strongly suggested 
that state laws banning interracial marriage were constitutional.  JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 
& CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, MARRIAGE:  A TREATISE (1907).  On the question of whether 
the Fourteenth Amendment barred states from prohibiting marriage between citizens of 
different races, Harlan and Butler referred their readers to the relevant section of a 1903 
constitutional law treatise by George F. Tucker that explained that “a statute prohibiting 
the marriage relation between white persons and persons of African descent in no way 
impairs their legal rights or denies to them equal protection of the laws.”  George F. Tucker, 
Constitutional Law, in 8 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 1074 (William Mack & 
Howard P. Nash eds., 1903) (emphasis added); see HARLAN & BUTLER, supra, at 26 n.36 
(providing that for “[d]eprivation of equal protection of laws by such [anti-
miscegenation] statutes,” readers should consult the Tucker treatise). 
 3 Similarly, Harlan was among the Court’s strongest proponents of the constitutional rights 
of residents of territory acquired by the United States in the wake of the Spanish-
American War, as reflected in a number of powerful dissenting opinions in cases in which 
Court majorities refused to extend constitutional rights to the residents of those 
territories.  See infra notes 62–68 and accompanying text. 
 4 As one example, see ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992) (discussing 
several of Harlan’s noteworthy opinions in civil rights cases and their role in shaping the 
argument for a “color blind” Constitution). 
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for Harlan’s strong civil rights views.5  Developing a rich sense of Harlan’s 
thinking has been difficult because Harlan did not leave behind a large 
trove of non-judicial writings.  There is, however, a remarkable source of 
Harlan’s thought that has been almost completely overlooked by scholars 
but that significantly expands our understanding of his civil rights 
jurisprudence:  Harlan’s constitutional law lectures of 1897–1898. 
Harlan taught law for twenty years at Columbian University (which was 
renamed to George Washington University in 1904).6  Indeed, at the end of 
his life, Harlan estimated that he had taught 10,000 law students,7 and 
described his law school teaching as “part of my life-work—and the most 
interesting part.”8  During the 1897–1898 academic year, Harlan taught a 
year-long course in constitutional law comprised of twenty-six lectures.  Two 
law students took down the lectures in shorthand and later transcribed 
them, producing a typed manuscript of almost 500 pages.9  These lectures 
are currently housed in the Harlan papers in the Library of Congress, but 
 
 5 But see James W. Gordon, Did the First Justice Harlan Have a Black Brother?, 15 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 159, 161 (1993) (attempting to explain Justice Harlan’s strong civil rights 
jurisprudence by arguing that Harlan may have had a black brother). 
 6 Columbian Law School Banquet, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1897, at 9; Richard D. Harlan, Justice 
Harlan and the Game of Golf, 62 SCRIBNER’S MAG. 626, 627 (1917).  Harlan’s primary course 
at George Washington was constitutional law, but Harlan typically taught a second course, 
which, over the years, included commercial law, conflict of laws, corporate law, evidence, 
insurance law, international law, personal property, and torts.  See, e.g. Florian Bartosic, 
The Constitution, Civil Liberties and John Marshall Harlan, 46 KY. L.J. 407, 414 n.41 (1958); 
Busy Day for Bryan, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1897, at 4; Columbian University Law School, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 14, 1900, at 24; Lectures at Columbian:  Well-Known Speakers Before the School of 
Jurisprudence and Diplomacy, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1901, at 12; University Notes, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 8, 1900, at 12; Enoch Aquila Chase, Some Recollections of Justice John Marshall 
Harlan (unpublished and undated), microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, Reel 
13 (Library of Cong.). 
 7 Letter from E. Polk Johnson to John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 24, 1911), microformed on 
JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 8. 
 8 Letter from John M. Harlan to Walter C. Clephane (Aug. 4, 1910), microformed on JOHN 
MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 13. 
 9 Letter from George Johannes to Hon. John Marshal [sic] Harlan (Oct. 21, 1955), 
microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 8.  In 1955, one of 
these two students, George Johannes, sent the transcription to Harlan’s grandson, John 
Marshall Harlan II, who had recently been appointed by President Dwight Eisenhower to 
serve on the United States Supreme Court.  Id.  The typed transcriptions, where it is 
possible to compare with simultaneous transcriptions by newspaper reporters, appear to 
have been highly accurate.  A reporter from the Washington Post covered Harlan’s Febru-
ary 19, 1898 lecture.  The Post article quoted the final 250–300 words of Harlan’s lecture 
in which the Justice addressed the national controversy that had erupted after the sinking 
of the Maine.  Justice Harlan’s Advice:  Americans Should Keep Cool and Avoid Hasty 
Conclusions, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1898, at 1.  The students’ transcription and the Post 
reporter’s transcription are remarkably similar. 
1040 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
they have never been published, have rarely been cited, and are largely 
unknown.10 
Harlan’s constitutional law lectures provide extraordinary insight into his 
civil rights jurisprudence.  In these lectures, Harlan lays out a remarkable 
and surprising theory of racial hierarchy—with Anglo-Saxons as the superior 
group—that seems to be at complete odds with his egalitarian civil rights 
jurisprudence.  But Harlan’s theory of racial superiority did not, for the 
most part, lead him to disregard the rights of those persons whom he 
considered to be racially inferior.  On the contrary, although Harlan argued 
that Anglo-Saxons were the superior racial group and that all other racial 
groups in the nation would eventually die out, he also contended that 
Anglo-Saxons would preserve their superior status only if they fulfilled what 
Harlan believed to be their sacred duty to protect the liberty of all persons 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, even those persons who had 
traditionally been subjugated in America such as African Americans.  
Accordingly, despite his embrace of a robust theory of racial supremacy, 
Harlan emerged as the greatest civil rights jurist of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 
Part I of this Article considers Harlan’s strong sense of racial hierarchy, 
and the obligation of Anglo-Saxons as the superior racial group to safeguard 
the rights of inferior groups as part of their sacred call to preserve Anglo-
American traditions of liberty.  Part II explores the tension between Harlan’s 
robust support for race-based immigration policies and his deep commit-
ment to the protection of the liberty of racial and ethnic minorities.  
Harlan was a man of rich contradictions.  Although Harlan stood largely 
alone among late nineteenth and early twentieth century jurists for his 
support of black rights, his civil rights vision was grounded upon an 
exceedingly complex and contradictory world view infused with racial 
hierarchy and racial paternalism. 
I.  HARLAN’S NOTIONS OF RACIAL HIERARCHY 
Harlan’s well-known concern for the political and civil rights of African 
Americans went hand-in-hand with his little-known embrace of notions of 
racial and ethnic hierarchy, with Anglo-Saxons as the preeminent group.  
Harlan’s 1897–1898 constitutional law lectures, delivered to an all-white 
audience, are particularly revealing. 
Although Harlan recognized that the United States was comprised of 
persons of many different racial and ethnic backgrounds, he told his 
 
 10 Harlan’s constitutional lectures will be published in 2013 by Carolina Academic Press.  
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES OF JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (Davison M. Douglas 
ed.) (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES]. 
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students that Anglo-Saxons were the superior race, and that in time, every 
other racial group in North America would die out.11  “To my mind, to my 
apprehension,” Harlan explained to his students in 1898, “it is as certain as 
fate that in the course of time there will be nobody on this North American 
continent but Anglo-Saxons.  All other races are steadily going to the wall.”12  
Consistent with other contemporary proponents of racial destiny, Harlan 
singled out Native Americans as candidates for early extinction, explaining 
to his students that they are “a race that is disappearing and probably within 
the lifetime of some that are now hearing me, there will be very few in this 
country.  In a hundred years you will probably not find one anywhere . . . .”13  
Harlan did not celebrate the demise of non-Anglo-Saxon racial groups in 
America, but nevertheless saw their elimination as inevitable. 
Harlan’s claim about Anglo-Saxon dominance contained strong echoes 
of Josiah Strong’s widely-read book with which Harlan was undoubtedly 
familiar, Our Country:  Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis, first published in 
1885, and republished in revised form in 1891.  Consistent with Harlan’s 
views of Anglo-Saxon dominance, Strong—a prominent Protestant 
clergyman—argued that Anglo-Saxons would, in time, displace all other 
races: 
Whether the extinction of inferior races before the advancing Anglo-
Saxon seems to the reader sad or otherwise, it certainly seems 
probable . . . . Is there room for reasonable doubt that [the Anglo-Saxon] 
race . . . is destined to dispossess many weaker races, assimilate others, 
and mold the remainder, until . . . it has Anglo-Saxonized mankind?14 
Harlan’s views expressed in his 1897–1898 constitutional law lectures were 
consistent with the Strong’s views about racial destiny. 
Despite Harlan’s embrace of theories of racial supremacy, what 
distinguished him from other jurists of his era was his belief that Anglo-
Saxons would sustain their superior place in the racial hierarchy only to the 
extent that they vigorously protected the constitutional liberty of all 
 
 11 See John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 11 (Jan. 8, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, 
supra note 10. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 JOSIAH STRONG, OUR COUNTRY:  ITS POSSIBLE FUTURE AND ITS PRESENT CRISIS 224–25 
(1885).  Strong wrote that “by the close of the [twentieth] century, the Anglo-Saxons will 
outnumber all the other civilized races of the world.”  Id. at 213.  Strong’s ideas would not 
have been novel to Harlan.  As a boy, Harlan read the works of many nineteenth-century 
historians who wrote of the providential destiny of Anglo-Saxons in North America.  
LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 119 (1999).  
Harlan’s constitutional law lectures contain strong echoes of Strong’s ideas—the 
superiority of Anglo-Saxons to other racial groups, the special role of Anglo-Saxons in the 
preservation of liberty, the dangers posed by the immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons, the 
expected extinction of non-Anglo-Saxons in North America, and optimism about 
America’s future under the leadership of Anglo-Saxons. 
1042 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
American citizens, particularly African Americans, for whom the denial of 
liberty had been particularly profound. 
In Harlan’s famous dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,15 issued one 
year prior to his 1897–1898 constitutional law lectures, Harlan explained the 
role of Anglo-Saxons in the preservation of liberty.  In that opinion, Harlan 
noted that “the white race”—a term synonymous with Harlan’s conception 
of “the Anglo-Saxon race”16—“deems itself to be the dominant race in this 
country.”17  Harlan agreed with that assessment of dominance:  “And so it is, 
in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power.”18 
Harlan, however, believed that this Anglo-Saxon dominance would 
continue only so long as Anglo-Saxons remained faithful to their obligation 
to preserve Anglo-American traditions of liberty:  “So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be [the dominant race] for all time, if it remains true to its great 
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.”19  Hence, for 
Harlan, the protection of “the principles of constitutional liberty,” 
particularly for African Americans, whose rights had long been egregiously 
disregarded, was a sacred obligation for Anglo-Saxons and the key to their 
continued dominance.20 
Harlan spent considerable time in his 1897–1898 constitutional law 
lectures explaining to his students the critical role that Anglo-Saxons had 
historically played in the protection of human liberty, dating back to the 
Magna Carta.  In his opening lecture in October 1897, Harlan observed that 
Anglo-Saxons “are the custodians of the principles of liberty which must 
prevail to the end, that men shall enjoy that freedom of speech and action 
which is essential to the security of life, liberty, and property.”21 
 
 15 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 16 Harlan frequently referred to the “Anglo-Saxon race.”  See, e.g., John Marshall Harlan, 
Lecture 25 (Apr. 30, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra note 10. 
 17 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. (emphasis added).  Harlan noted in his Plessy dissent that “[e]very true man has pride 
of race, and under appropriate circumstances when the rights of others, his equals before 
the law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express such pride. . . .”  Id. at 554.  So, 
for Harlan, with respect to the civil and political rights that every American citizen 
enjoyed, principles of equal treatment must be respected, but expressions of racial and 
ethnic pride were appropriate.  Harlan himself certainly had great pride in his Anglo-
Saxon ancestry. 
 20 For Harlan, lawyers played a critical role in this stewardship:  “[I]t is true in the history of 
all the Anglo-Saxon race, and many other races, that it is the lawyer who has stepped 
forward and has put himself in the way of arbitrary power to defend the rights of man.”  
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 2 (Oct. 21, 1897), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra 
note 10. 
 21 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 1 (Oct. 14, 1897), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra 
note 10.  For Harlan, the protection of “life, liberty, and property” was central to his 
concept of Anglo-Saxon liberty, and the jury was the central mechanism for ensuring that 
liberty was appropriately protected.  Harlan explained his conception of the rights 
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Harlan believed that the United States would become the greatest nation 
on earth during the twentieth century—but only if it remained true to its 
call to preserve Anglo-American traditions of constitutional liberty.  He told 
his students in 1898 that the United States was the nation most likely “to 
shape the destinies of Europe and [of] the far eastern countries and of the 
whole human race in the next century.”22  “But,” said Harlan, “the nation 
would fulfill its role as world leader only if it maintained its position as the 
world’s greatest defender of the ‘rights of man.’”23 
Central to Harlan’s constitutional jurisprudence was his view that the 
United States Constitution was part of God’s providential design to preserve 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberty in America.24  Harlan’s view of American 
history was heavily influenced by his belief that God was actively involved in 
human affairs and used certain individuals and events to help the nation 
fulfill its sacred destiny as the world’s great defender of human liberty.  
Hence, for Harlan, the preservation of Anglo-Saxon traditions of liberty in 
the United States was a sacred call and essential to the nation’s fulfillment of 
its destiny. 
Harlan likened the settlement of Anglo-Saxons in North America in the 
seventeenth century to the coming of the Kingdom of God of which Jesus 
 
protected by the Constitution in a 1900 lecture at the University of Pennsylvania:  “When 
I speak of liberty, I mean such liberty as is enjoyed in this country[that] recognizes the 
right of all persons within its jurisdiction, of whatever race, to the equal protection of laws 
in every matter affecting life, liberty, or property.”  Justice Harlan’s Oration, PHILA. PRESS, Feb. 
22, 1900, microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 16 
(emphasis added). 
 22 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 26 (May 7, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra 
note 10. 
 23 In 1900, Harlan said of the United States:  “The time is certain to arrive, if this people 
remain true to their great destiny, when our nation will be, if it has not already become, 
the most powerful factor in all movements that affect the peace of the world and the 
rights of man.”  Mr. Justice Harlan Reviews The Country’s Constitution, N. AM. (Feb. 22, 
1900), microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 16. 
 24 Harlan’s dual commitments to his Christian faith and constitutional liberty were central 
organizing principles in his life and in his work as a Supreme Court Justice.  Justice David 
Brewer joked that Harlan went to sleep “with one hand on the Constitution and the other 
on the Bible.”  Justice Harlan Dined, WASH. EVENING STAR, Dec. 10, 1902, microformed on 
JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 16.  Harlan, in response, noted:  “I 
do not . . . remember to have gone to bed with the Bible in one hand and the 
Constitution in the other, but I fully believe in both the Bible and the Constitution.”  
James B. Morrow, Talks with Notable Men:  John M. Harlan, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Feb. 25, 
1906, microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 16.  At a 
tribute for Harlan following his death, Attorney General George Wickersham observed:  
“The Constitution and the Bible were the objects of his constant thought and 
consideration, and if the latter was to him always vox Dei, the former . . . was no less so.”  
Proceedings on the Death of Mr. Justice Harlan, 222 U.S. v, at xii (1911). 
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spoke.25  He also explained that certain eighteenth-century historical figures 
such as George Washington and Thomas Jefferson had been “raised up” as a 
“special Providence” to help found the nation with its central commitment 
to liberty.26 
Harlan saw the Civil War in similar terms.  In Harlan’s view, the nation’s 
fundamental commitment to liberty, first articulated in the Declaration of 
Independence, had been profoundly betrayed by the nation’s ongoing 
embrace of slavery—an institution that in his view was the greatest evil in 
American history.27  But, for Harlan, the Supreme Court’s 1857 decision in 
Dred Scott v. Sanford,28 which helped provoke the war, was a  
 special Providence to this country in that it laid the foundation of a civil 
war which, terrible as it was, awful as it was in its consequences in the loss 
of life and money, was in the end a blessing to this country in that it rid 
us of the institution of African slavery.29   
Harlan also saw both Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant as 
providential figures raised up by God to help the nation rid itself of slavery.30  
 
 25 Harlan compared “the planting of seeds of voluntary government” in British North 
America to the parable of the planting of the mustard seed that Jesus used to explain the 
concept of the Kingdom of God:  “[Whereunto shall we liken the kingdom of God?]  [A] 
mustard seed, which, when it is sown in the earth, [is] less than all the seeds that [be] in 
the earth.  But when it is sown, it groweth up, and becometh greater than all . . . [the 
herbs, and] shooteth out great branches; so that the fowls of the air may lodge under the 
shadow of it.”  John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 2 (Oct. 21, 1897), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
LECTURES, supra note 10 (quoting Mark 4:31–32 (King James)). 
 26 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 20 (Mar. 19, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, 
supra note 10.  Harlan elaborated:   
We sometimes are in the habit in our ordinary conversation of speaking of 
particular things which have occurred as Providence:  ‘That was a special 
Providence.’  We say that George Washington was a special Providence, that he was 
raised up for the work he did, and that no other man could have done the work so 
far as we can tell that he did. 
  Id.  Harlan also viewed Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence, as “a 
special Providence” who had done work “that no other man could have performed.”  Id. 
 27 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 26 (May 7, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra 
note 10 (“It is well for us that [slavery] is gone, never to be restored.  And whatever the 
perils may be against which this country will have to contend, they will be a less[er] evil 
than was the existence of African slavery in this country.”). 
 28 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 29 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 20 (Mar. 19, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, 
supra note 10. 
 30 Id.  Harlan’s strong statements on slavery are particularly striking, given his personal 
history as a member of a slaveholding family and as an early opponent of the 
Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment.  See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, 
JUDICIAL ENIGMA:  THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 61 (1995); Alan F. Westin, John Marshall 
Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes:  The Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE 
L.J. 637, 638 (1957).  Harlan’s views on race, however, underwent a significant 
transformation during the late 1860s and early 1870s.  Harlan was appalled at the 
continuing violence against southern blacks during Reconstruction and viewed southern 
resistance to the new constitutional order as threatening to the Union.  Accordingly, 
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A devout Calvinist who at one point considered resigning from the Supreme 
Court to devote his life to building a Presbyterian “cathedral” in 
Washington, D.C.,31 Harlan saw his dual commitments to constitutional 
liberty and his Presbyterian faith as inextricably intertwined.32 
II.  HARLAN AND THE IMMIGRATION OF NON-ANGLO-SAXONS TO THE 
UNITED STATES 
Consistent with his views of racial hierarchy, Harlan expressed grave 
concern about the presence of non-Anglo-Saxon racial and ethnic groups in 
the United States who he feared were unlikely to assimilate to American 
democratic traditions and embrace the nation’s commitment to the 
protection of individual liberty.  Indeed, in Harlan’s view, the greatest threat 
to the nation was the immigration to the United States of hundreds of 
thousands of non-Anglo-Saxons from Eastern and Southern Europe and 
China who were not steeped in the traditions of Anglo-American liberty.33 
This concern about immigration posed a fundamental conflict for 
Harlan.  Though he was the greatest promoter of constitutional liberty on 
the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century, he was also one of his 
era’s great proponents of using the nation’s immigration laws to screen out 
what he believed to be undesirable racial and ethnic groups. 
 
Harlan became an enthusiastic supporter of the Fourteenth Amendment and of black 
rights during the 1870s.  See generally Westin, supra note 30 (discussing the evolution of 
Justice Harlan’s civil rights jurisprudence over the span of his lifetime). 
 31 Justice Harlan May Quit Bench, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1906, at 1. 
 32 Late in his life, Harlan observed:  “I never think of the American constitutional system 
without being proud of the Presbyterian Church.  Liberty regulated by law and 
Presbyterianism are . . . so linked together historically that a Presbyterian, at least, cannot 
well think of one without thinking of the other.”  Nestor of the High Tribunal, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 16, 1905, at E7.  Harlan cited with approval historian James Froude who claimed that 
Calvinism, Harlan’s religious tradition, was “the creed of republics.”  Id. (quoting JAMES 
ANTHONY FROUDE, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE FALL OF WOLSEY TO THE DEATH OF 
ELIZABETH 376 (1871)).  Again, Harlan’s views track those of Josiah Strong, one of the 
most prominent Protestant clergymen of the late nineteenth century.  Strong, in his 
widely read book, Our Country:  Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis, extolled Anglo-
Saxon commitments to liberty in terms similar to Harlan:   
The Anglo-Saxon is representative of two great ideas, which are closely related.  
One of them is that of civil liberty.  Nearly all of the civil liberty of the world is 
enjoyed by Anglo-Saxons . . . . The other great idea of which the Anglo-Saxon is 
the exponent is that of a pure spiritual Christianity . . . . It follows, then, that the 
Anglo-Saxon, as the great representative of these two ideas . . . sustains peculiar 
relations to the world’s future, [and] is divinely commissioned to be, in a peculiar 
sense, his brother’s keeper.   
STRONG, supra note 14, at 208–10 (emphasis in original). 
 33 See John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 14 (Jan. 29, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, 
supra note 10 (describing immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons as a “real peril that is before 
us”). 
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Harlan’s concerns about the immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons to the 
United States were widely shared.  For example, Ellwood Cubberley, a 
distinguished social scientist at Stanford University, writing in the early 
twentieth century, described the effects of the increase in non-Anglo-Saxon 
immigration that took place during the final two decades of the nineteenth 
century:  “About 1882, the character of our immigration changed in a very 
remarkable manner.  Immigration from the north of Europe dropped off 
rather abruptly, and in its place immigration from the south and east of 
Europe set in and soon developed into a great stream.”34  In language with 
which Harlan would have agreed, Cubberley observed that: 
These [S]outhern and [E]astern Europeans are of a very different type 
from the [N]orth Europeans who preceded them.  Illiterate, docile, 
lacking in self-reliance and initiative, and not possessing the Anglo-
Teutonic conceptions of law, order, and government, their coming has 
served to dilute tremendously our national stock, and to corrupt our civic 
life.35 
Cubberley argued that “[o]ur task is to . . . assimilate and amalgamate these 
people as a part of our American race, and to implant in their children, so 
far as can be done, the Anglo-Saxon conception of righteousness, law and 
order, and popular government.”36  Whereas Cubberley counseled 
assimilation as the answer, Harlan worried that certain racial and ethnic 
groups—particularly the Chinese—would not, in fact, assimilate into 
American political and constitutional traditions.37 
Harlan feared that political control in many of the nation’s great cities 
had been captured by non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants who did not embrace 
American traditions of civil liberty.  He told his students: 
In the large cities that are the source of most of the dangers that threaten 
our American civilization, men are invested with the privilege of 
citizenship of the United States under these naturalization laws who have 
not the slightest idea about our institutions, who scarcely know our 
language, whose habits have been formed up past manhood in other 
lands, under other systems of government, and who never do understand 
our civilization as we . . . who were born here [understand it].38 
 
 34 ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF EDUCATION 14 (Henry Suzzallo ed., 
1909). 
 35 Id. at 15. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 11 (Jan. 8, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, 
supra note 10 (describing immigrants in large cities as “the source of most of the dangers 
that threaten our American civilization”); John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 14 (Jan. 29, 
1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra note 10 (discussing the “real peril” 
created by large numbers of immigrants in U.S. cities). 
 38 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 11 (Jan. 8, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra 
note 10. 
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“There is not much danger to the future of this country, in my judgment,” 
Harlan explained, “[other than] the large cities of the country that 
dominate the states, whose votes [will] . . . decide the politics of this country 
for years to come.”39 
For Harlan, ethnic-based machine politics in cities such as New York and 
Chicago were of particular concern.  Harlan explained: 
Go to the great city of New York.  Why, some men have said that it is 
more European than American.  [There is] a good deal of truth in it.  
The contests in [the] great states of this country have turned upon the 
votes of great cities.  And those great cities have a majority of men—or 
[an] enormous percentage of men—not born and reared under our 
institutions, not born and reared under the institutions of other 
countries like England . . . understand[ing] what life, liberty, and 
property mean, but born under despotisms, who have been in the habit 
all their lives of bowing to titles and powers that did not know what 
liberty was, and who come to this country mistaking liberty for license 
and license for liberty.40 
Because of the large number of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants in certain 
states, Harlan told his students that he took comfort in the equal 
representation requirement in the U.S. Senate that operated to reduce the 
influence of certain states with large non-Anglo-Saxon immigrant 
populations, such as Illinois and New York.41 
Though Harlan worried about immigration from Southern and Eastern 
Europe, he expressed even greater concern about the Chinese.  Although 
Congress, in 1882, had enacted legislation imposing a moratorium on 
additional Chinese immigration,42 Harlan feared that America’s borders, 
 
 39 Id.  Harlan also thought that many of these Southern and Eastern European immigrants 
had unsavory backgrounds.  He complained that  
our own doors are open practically to all the world, and the jails and penitentiaries 
of Europe are being emptied into this country, and large portions of them lodge 
in these great cities that are now becoming so large and so corrupt that they are 
substantially controlling the public policy of many of the states, despite what the 
people out in the country and away from such cities may want.   
  Id. 
 40 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 4 (Oct. 30, 1897), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra 
note 10.  According to the 1900 census, each of the ten most populous cities in the 
United States had a substantial foreign-born population.  Even when those persons born 
in the British Isles are excluded, the foreign-born population percentage in 1900 in the 
nation’s ten most populous cities was quite substantial:  New York City (26%), Chicago 
(28%), Philadelphia (12%), St. Louis (14%), Boston (19%), Baltimore (11%), Cleveland 
(25%), Buffalo (24%), San Francisco (26%), and Cincinnati (14%).  See 1 DEPARTMENT 
OF THE INTERIOR, TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1900:  
POPULATION PART I, at clxvii–clxxix tbls. LXXVIII–LXXXIII (1901). 
 41 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 14 (Jan. 29, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, 
supra note 10. 
 42 In 1882, Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act that imposed a moratorium on 
additional immigration of Chinese into the United States.  Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. 
No. 47-71 (1882), repealed by Magnuson Act, Pub. L. No. 78-199; 57 Stat. 600 (1943); see 
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particularly its northern border with Canada, were vulnerable to the illegal 
immigration of persons of Chinese ancestry, a problem made worse by the 
fact that, to Harlan, the Chinese “all look alike.”43  Harlan argued that it is “a 
little difficult to enforce that [exclusion] law, particularly because of the 
invisible line that separates this country from Canada.  They can land at 
Victoria [in British Columbia] and there is a wide space of country all along 
between the United States and Canada through which they can come.”44  
Addressing his constitutional law students in 1898, at a time when the U.S. 
population was about seventy-five million, Harlan claimed that had Congress 
not chosen to bar future Chinese immigration in 1882, the American West 
would have been flooded with fifty million Chinese immigrants, and “[t]hey 
would have rooted out the American population” in that part of the 
country.45 
Harlan favored the exclusion of Chinese from America on the grounds 
that they were “a race utterly foreign to us and never will assimilate with 
us.”46  Harlan explained that the Chinese “are pagans in religion, so 
different from us that they do not inter-marry with us.  And we don’t want to 
inter-marry with them.  And whey [sic] they die, no matter how long they 
have been here, they make arrangements to be sent back to their 
fatherland.”47  Harlan believed that the Chinese, even those born within the 
United States, retained loyalty to their homeland and hence possessed an 
uncertain commitment to American democratic traditions.48 
 
also ANDREW GYOY, CLOSING THE GATE:  RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT 
1–2 (1998). 
 43 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 14 (Jan. 29, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, 
supra note 10. 
 44 Id.  In fact, many Chinese immigrated to British Columbia, Canada, during the late 
nineteenth century and then crossed the border into the United States illegally.  The port 
of Victoria in British Columbia was a particularly popular immigration site, and the 
United States-Canada border was not heavily guarded.  ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATE:  
CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943, at 152–55 (2003). 
 45 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 20 (Mar. 19, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, 
supra note 10. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Harlan’s oft-noted comments about the Chinese in his Plessy v. Ferguson dissent must be 
read through the prism of his anti-Chinese views.  That the Louisiana segregation law at 
issue in Plessy imposed a much harsher regime on blacks than on Chinese deeply 
disturbed Harlan:   
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging 
to it to become citizens of the United States.  Persons belonging to it are, with few 
exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country.  I allude to the Chinese race.  
But by the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach 
with white citizens of the United States, while citizens of the black race in 
Louisiana, many of whom, perhaps, risked their lives for the preservation of the 
Union . . . are yet declared to be criminals . . . if they ride in a public coach 
occupied by citizens of the white race.   
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As a result of Harlan’s concerns about non-Anglo-Saxon immigration, he 
was an enthusiastic proponent of race-based immigration policies, and 
believed that immigration reform was perhaps the most pressing issue in the 
nation.49  Harlan applauded the nation’s decision in 1882 to stop Chinese 
immigration and favored immigration policies that made explicit racial 
distinctions in determining which groups should be permitted to immigrate 
to the United States.  Harlan explained:  “The power of the government of 
the United States to exclude any particular people from our shores is 
beyond question.  We could exclude any particular race anywhere on the 
earth from our country by an act of Congress . . . .”50  As a Supreme Court 
Justice, Harlan joined the Court’s 1892 decision in Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States, which gave Congress broad latitude to make racial distinctions in its 
immigration policy.51  Harlan returned to this immigration theme again and 
again throughout his constitutional law lectures, telling his students that 
“the greatest farce” of the nineteenth century has been the nation’s 
 
  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Though this 
observation about the Chinese was not essential to his conclusion about the 
constitutionality of the Louisiana segregation law, Harlan found it particularly galling that 
the law treated the Chinese more favorably than it did blacks.  Harlan would continue to 
worry about what he perceived to be the Chinese menace for the remainder of his life.  In 
1908, three years before his death, Harlan, speaking of the Chinese, warned in a widely 
noted speech that it was inevitable that there would someday be a military conflict 
“between the yellow race and the white race that will shake the earth.”  Harlan Prophecies A 
Great Race War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1908, at 3.  Accordingly, Harlan urged Congress to 
build the greatest navy in the world that could defend the nation and make every 
American port impregnable to Chinese attack.  Justice Harlan’s Plans, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 
1908, at 5.  United States Senator Albert Beveridge congratulated Harlan on his speech 
on the Chinese threat, calling it a “bugle blast of Americanism.”  Letter from Albert J. 
Beveridge to John Marshall Harlan (Feb. 9, 1908), microformed on JOHN MARSHALL 
HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 13. 
 49 See John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 11 (Jan. 8, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, 
supra note 10.  Harlan told his students that immigration reform was one of the most 
important issues facing the nation:   
If there is any one duty resting upon this country at this time that is supreme in my 
opinion it is the necessity to reorganize that whole system [of naturalization] and 
to see to it that American citizenship does not become as cheap in the future as it 
has been in the past.   
  Id. 
 50 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 14 (Jan. 29, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, 
supra note 10. 
 51 142 U.S. 651 (1892).  In Nishimura Ekiu, the Court noted with approval that Congress had 
plenary authority over immigration, was free to forbid “the immigration of particular 
classes of foreigners,” and acted constitutionally when it barred Chinese immigration.  Id. 
at 659–60; see also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (holding that the 
Chinese Exclusion Act was a constitutional exercise of legislative power). 
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permissive immigration laws that opened the nation’s doors to so many non-
Anglo-Saxons.52 
Harlan also took the view that Congress had broad latitude in making 
race-based distinctions in granting citizenship rights.  In United States v. Wong 
Kim Ark,53 Harlan joined a dissenting opinion concluding that a child of 
Chinese parents, though born in the United States and hence within the 
ambit of the birthright citizenship language of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, was nevertheless not a citizen because, in his view, the child 
and his parents remained loyal subjects of the Emperor of China.54  Harlan 
explained his decision in this case to his students:  “My belief was [that we] 
never intended to embrace everybody in our citizenship . . . [such as] the 
child of parents who cannot, under the law, become naturalized 
[citizens] . . . of the United States.”55  Later, speaking of birthright 
citizenship, Harlan concluded that place of birth should not control:  “Just 
because a cat has kittens in an oven is no sign they are biscuits.”56 
Although Harlan opposed immigration and citizenship rights for 
Chinese, he did dissent from opinions denying Chinese aliens lawfully living 
in the United States certain rights.57  Moreover, while most of Harlan’s 
judicial colleagues viewed Native Americans as non-citizens and hence 
 
 52 Harlan also joined opinions sustaining the constitutionality of certain immigration 
procedures tainted with racial classifications.  For example, in Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), Harlan joined the Court’s opinion providing that Congress 
had plenary authority to determine the conditions under which an alien was expelled 
from the country, even if the expulsion process raised issues of racial discrimination.  
Justice Brewer condemned the majority, noting that the while “[t]he expulsion of a race 
may be within the inherent powers of a despotism,” Congress had no authority to 
determine “whether whole classes in our midst shall, for no crime but that of their race 
and birthplace, be driven from our territory.”  Id. at 737–38 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
 53 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
 54 Id. at 705–06 (Fuller, J., dissenting, with whom Harlan, J., concurred).  Justice Clarence 
Thomas has written that “on Harlan’s principles Chinese and anyone who undertook the 
duties of citizenship could become citizens.”  Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” 
of the Constitution—The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. 
L.J. 983, 994 (1987).  That assertion is inconsistent with Harlan’s citizenship opinions 
regarding the Chinese. 
 55 John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 26 (May 7, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra 
note 10. 
 56 Enoch Aquila Chase, Some Recollections of Justice John Marshall Harlan (unpublished 
and undated), microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 13 
(Chase was a student in one of Harlan’s classes). 
 57 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 694 (1887) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing 
with Court’s decision to release a man from custody who had forcefully removed lawful 
Chinese aliens from their homes).  See generally Earl M. Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind:  
John Marshall Harlan’s View of Race and the Constitution, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 973, 999–1016 
(1996) (noting the difference between Harlan’s decisions in immigration cases, in which 
Harlan was very harsh towards the Chinese, and his decisions in cases involving the rights 
of lawful residents, in which he was very protective of the rights of the Chinese). 
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outside the protection of the Reconstruction-era amendments, Harlan 
disagreed.  In Elk v. Wilkens,58 the Court held that a Native American, though 
born in the United States and not living on a reservation, was not a citizen 
and hence enjoyed no voting rights unless he had been naturalized.  Harlan 
dissented, concluding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment granted citizenship rights to all Native Americans who “had 
severed their tribal connections.”59  Similarly, in Talton v. Mayes,60 Harlan was 
a lone dissenter in a case in which the Court held that the constitutional 
right to a grand jury indictment did not extend to Native Americans on trial 
in tribal courts.61 
Harlan’s views on the application of the procedural protections of the 
Bill of Rights to tribal courts was consistent with his dissenting opinions in 
the Insular Cases,62 in which Harlan argued that the protections of the Bill of 
Rights extended to persons living in U.S. territories acquired during the 
Spanish-American War.  These dissenting opinions must be viewed through 
the prism of Harlan’s central commitment to the preservation of Anglo-
American traditions of liberty for all persons subject to the jurisdiction of 
American law.  In Downes v. Bidwell,63 for example, the Court held that the 
Bill of Rights did not apply in the newly acquired U.S. territories.  The Court 
justified its position by observing that “those possessions are inhabited by 
alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, 
and modes of thought,” and so, “the administration of government and 
justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be impossible.”64  
The Court argued that “principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-
 
 58 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
 59 Id. at 116 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 60 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
 61 Id.  Harlan dissented without opinion. 
 62 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); 
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 
(1905); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 
(1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United 
States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & 
Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); 
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 
(1901); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).  The Insular Cases were a collection of 
several cases decided in the early twentieth century in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered the application of the Bill of Rights to territory acquired during the Spanish-
American War.  In these cases, the Court held that because it was not envisioned that 
these territories would ever enjoy statehood, the Bill of Rights did not apply.  See Alan 
Tauber, The Empire Forgotten:  The Application of the Bill of Rights to U.S. Territories, 57 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 147, 148 (2006) (“[In the Insular Cases], the Supreme Court ruled that 
these lands were ‘foreign in a domestic sense’ and that they were not a part of the United 
States for all constitutional purposes.”). 
 63 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
 64 Id. at 287. 
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Saxon character”65 would offer sufficient protection of the interests of those 
persons living in the territories. 
Harlan, in dissent, criticized the Court, claiming that its actions 
suggested the end of “the era of constitutional liberty.”66  Harlan argued 
that: 
The wise men who framed the Constitution, and the patriotic people 
who adopted it, were unwilling to depend for their safety upon what, in 
the opinion [of the Court], is described as “certain principles of natural 
justice inherent in Anglo-Saxon character . . . .”  They well remembered 
that Anglo-Saxons across the ocean had attempted, in defiance of law 
and justice, to trample upon the rights of Anglo-Saxons on this 
continent . . . [and to] destroy the privileges that inhere in liberty.67 
As for the problem of the assimilation of alien peoples—a problem with 
which Harlan was quite sympathetic—Harlan concluded that: 
Whether a particular race will or will not assimilate with our people, and 
whether they can or cannot with safety to our institutions be brought 
within the operation of the Constitution, is a matter to be thought of 
when it is proposed to acquire their territory by treaty.  A mistake in the 
acquisition of territory . . . cannot be made the ground for violating the 
Constitution or refusing to give full effect to its provisions.  The 
Constitution is not to be obeyed or disobeyed as the circumstances of a 
particular crisis in our history may suggest . . . .68 
For Harlan, in the same way that America’s treatment of African 
Americans was a test of the nation’s commitment to Anglo-American 
principles of liberty, so, too, America’s treatment of its subject peoples in its 
newly acquired territories was also a profound test of the nation’s 
commitment to liberty.  Regardless of whether it was wise to exercise control 
over certain foreign territories, the United States was now obliged, in 
Harlan’s view, to extend to these peoples the full protection of the Bill of 
Rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Harlan was the most passionate voice on the United States Supreme 
Court during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for the rights 
of African Americans, and one of the most passionate voices defending the 
liberty interests of those non-white persons living in territories acquired in 
the aftermath of the Spanish-American War.  Harlan’s contemporary 
reputation as one of the great defenders of civil rights is based largely on his 
dissenting opinions in these cases. 
 
 65 Id. at 280. 
 66 Id. at 379 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 381. 
 68 Id. at 384. 
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This strong commitment to protecting the liberty of “outsider” groups 
appears to be in sharp tension with Harlan’s embrace of a racial hierarchy 
with Anglo-Saxons as the superior racial group, and his opposition to the 
immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons to the United States.  But Harlan’s 
conception of racial hierarchy operated within a framework of racial 
paternalism:  Anglo-Saxons would maintain their racial dominance only to 
the extent that they fulfilled their sacred mission to protect Anglo-American 
traditions of constitutional liberty for all people living within the nation’s 
jurisdiction, even outsider groups destined for extinction.  And so, John 
Marshall Harlan, a firm believer in racial supremacy and a strong opponent 
of the immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons, was nevertheless his era’s greatest 
judicial proponent of constitutional liberty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
